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HIGH SEAS NARCOTICS SMUGGLING AND SECTION 955a
OF TITLE 21: OVEREXTENSION OF THE PROTECTIVE
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
INTRODUCTION

In an effort to facilitate criminal prosecutions and thereby halt the
tremendous flow of narcotics into the United States,' Congress in 1980

enacted section 955a of Title 21 of the United States Code, The
Marijuana On the High Seas Act. 2 The statute provides for the

punishment of narcotics smugglers apprehended aboard vessels by
proscribing possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
distribute. 3 Prior to the enactment of section 955a, the government
was able to punish this offense only by charging conspiracies to violate
existing statutes, 4 a process that frustrated prosecutors and created
problems of statutory construction. 5
1. H.R. Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as House
Report]; see Coast Guard Drug Interdiction: Hearings on H.R. 10371 and H.R.
10698 Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1978) (statement of Rear
Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief, Office of Operations, Dep't
of Transp.) [hereinafter cited as Coast Guard Drug Interdiction]. In 1978, the Coast
Guard participated in the seizure of over 150 vessels and 3.5 million pounds of
narcotics, worth over $1 billion. House Report, supra, at 4; see Coast Guard Drug
Interdiction, supra, at 119. It is estimated, however, that this accounts for only 8 to
10% of the narcotics transported into the United States by vessel. House Report,
supra, at 4.
2. Pub. L. No. 96-350, § 1, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a
(West Supp. 1981)); see United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1341
(S.D. Fla. 1981). Section 955a was enacted to fill a loophole in the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236
(codified in scattered sections throughout U.S.C.). This loophole was created by the
repeal in 1970 of § 184a, which proscribed possession of a controlled substance when
aboard a United States-registered vessel on a foreign voyage. 21 U.S.C. § 184a (1964)
(repealed 1970); Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (statement of Rep.
Mario Biaggi, Chm'n, Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation) [hereinafter cited
as Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement]; id. at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Adm'n, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
3. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a (West Supp. 1981). The statute also proscribes manufacture or distribution of, as well as possession with intent to manufacture, a controlled
substance. Id. § 955a(a)-(c).
4. See Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 65 (statement of
Michael P. Sullivan, Ass't U.S. Att'y, Chief, Crim. Div., S.D. Fla.). The conspiracy
offenses require a lesser standard of proof than the substantive narcotics violations.
E.g., United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1268 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1126 n.1 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1262
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); see infra note 100 and accompanying
text.
5. See Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 34 (statement of
Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Dep't of Transp.); see,
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The broad grant of jurisdiction embodied in section 955a simplifies
the process by eliminating the need for a conspiracy charge. Under the
statute, federal courts can assert subject matter jurisdiction over
United States nationals regardless of the nationality or location of the

vessel upon which they are apprehended. 7 Jurisdiction is also asserted
over foreign nationals when they are aboard United States vessels
regardless of location, 8 stateless vessels" on the high seas' 0 and any
vessel within the customs waters of the United States." Subsection
e.g., United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker,
609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980).
6. "A State's 'jurisdiction' is its competence under international law to prosecute
and punish for crime." Dickinson, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J.
Int'l L. supp., pt. 2, at 435, 467-69 (1935). If a State prescribes or enforces a rule of
law that it has no jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce, it is a violation of international
law. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 8
(1965).
7. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(b) (West Supp. 1981). Vessels have the nationality of the
State whose flag they are entitled to fly. Convention on the High Seas art. 5, opened
for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(entered into force Sept. 30, 1962). With limited exceptions, the flag State has
exclusive jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas. Id. art. 6(1).
8. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981). A vessel of the United States is
defined as "any vessel documented under the laws of the United States ... or owned
in whole or in part by the United States or a citizen of the United States, or a
corporation created under the laws of the United States." 21 U.S.C.A. §955b(c)
(West Supp. 1981).
9. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981). This subsection applies to a vessel
"subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," id., which is defined as "a vessel
without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958." 21
U.S.C.A. § 955b(d) (West Supp. 1981). Under the Convention, a vessel assimilated to
a vessel without nationality is a vessel that sails under the flags of two or more
countries, using them according to convenience. Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 7, art. 6, para. 2; see United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
10. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955b(b) (West Supp. 1981). The "high seas" means all waters
beyond the territorial seas of the United States and beyond the territorial seas of any
foreign nation. Id. The United States claims a three-mile territorial sea. Cunard S.S.
Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923); see P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial
Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 56-60 (1927); Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth
Amendment, 32 U. Miami L. Rev. 51, 57 (1977). Under the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10,
1964), the United States is granted limited jurisdiction over a "'contiguous zone"
outside the territorial sea but not exceeding 12 miles from the United States coast. Id.
art. 24. For purposes of criminal jurisdiction, the United States recognizes the area
beyond the three-mile sea as the high seas. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136
(5th Cir. 1980).
11. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(c) (West Supp. 1981). The customs waters of the United
States are waters extending up to four leagues (twelve miles) from the United States
coast. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1976). This area is also referred to as the contiguous zone.
See Carmichael, supra note 10, at 56. Within this zone, the United States possesses
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(a) of section 955a contains the broadest grant of jurisdiction. It
applies to foreign nationals aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.
More significantly, it does not require any allegation or proof that the
controlled substance possessed is intended for distribution within the
United States.12
This Note examines section 955a in light of established jurisdictional
principles of international law. In order to assert jurisdiction over an
offense, a State must apply one of the bases of international jurisdiction: universality, nationality, passive personality, objective territoriality or the protective principle. 13 Only the objective territorial and
protective principles can be relied upon when the United States is
attempting to prosecute foreign nationals engaged in narcotics trafficking on the high seas in vessels not of United States registry. 4
When an offense is committed outside the territorial United States
with the intent to cause an adverse effect within the territory, and
such an effect does take place, objective territorial jurisdiction is
present.'s If an act is directed at the security of the United States but
adverse effect upon the State, protective jurisdicproduces no actual
6
tion governs.'

Critical examination of section 955a reveals the impropriety of
applying the statute to foreign nationals arrested aboard stateless
vessels on the high seas without any allegation or proof that the
controlled substances possessed are intended for distribution within
limited jurisdiction for the purposes of ensuring compliance with fiscal, customs and
sanitation laws. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 10, art. 24.
12. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981). The subsection also applies to
United States nationals. Id.
13. E.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal.), appeal
dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3128 (1981); United
States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on othergrounds sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
14. Universality jurisdiction is unavailable, as that principle applies only to
piracy. The nationality principle does not apply because the defendant is not a
United States national. Passive personality is unavailable because the United States
does not recognize that as a valid basis of jurisdiction. The territoriality principle, or
its corollary, the law of the flag theory, is applicable only when the acts proscribed
take place within the United States or aboard a United States vessel. See infra pt. I.
15. E.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886-87 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8. 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980); see infra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
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the United States. By simplifying the law, Congress has created a
statute that is capable of application in such a manner as to exceed
permissible limits of jurisdiction granted a State under international
law.
I. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION
Were a State to apply its laws extraterritorially with no consideration given to the right of other States to do the same, the inevitable
result would be chaos in the international system and conflicts between sovereigns. 1 7 Consequently, principles have been developed
which regulate the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction by a State
over offenses committed within and, more importantly, without its
territory.'
The United States expressed its intention to adhere to
these principles in The Paquete Habana:"I"International law is part
of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." 20 Congress, however, may override international law, but only where the
statute 1in question expressly provides that it is the intent of Congress to
2
do so.

17. See 1 C. Hyde, International Law § 2 (2d rev. ed. 1947); M. von Redlich,
The Law of Nations §§ 1, 16 (2d ed. 1937).
18. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§
17, 18, 30, 33, 34 & reporter's note 2 (1965); see United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d
8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d
882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Layton, 509
F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 3128 (1981); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487
(S.D. Cal. 1960), af'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Rocha v.
United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); Dickinson,
supra note 6 at 445.
19. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The issue was whether fishing vessels flying the Spanish
flag were subject to capture off the coast of Cuba by a United States steamship. In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Gray held that the seizure of the vessels was in
violation of international law. Id. at 714. In reaching his conclusion, Justice Gray
relied upon ancient principles of international law, which make coastal fishing
vessels exempt from capture when plying their trade during time of war. Id. at 700.
20. Id. Since The Paquete Habana was decided, United States courts have consistently reiterated their intention to follow principles of international law. E.g.,
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73 (1941); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
886-87 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340,
1342 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan.
1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
193 F. Supp. 375, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afJ'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), reo'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution 221 (1972).
21. See Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981); FTC v.
Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 & n.130 (D.C.
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Within the international legal system, five principles of subject
matter jurisdiction exist. 22 Under the most limited and seldom used
principle, universality, any State has jurisdiction over an offense if it
has custody of the offender.2 3 At present, this principle applies only
to piracy,2 4 which is condemned as a violation of the Law of Nations,2 5 and thus punishable by all. 20 Some have argued that slavetrading is also a universally cognizable offense.27 Narcotics trafficking, however, has not been elevated to that status, despite an attempt
to do so in 1936.28
The second principle, nationality, is accepted by all States.20 It
confers subject matter jurisdiction upon a State over all violations of
Cir. 1980); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
This presumption of conformity with principles of international law was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804). The Court stated that "an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
Id. at 117-18, 2 Cranch at 118.
22. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 884 (1967); see Dickinson, supra note 6, at 445.
23. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7, arts. 14-19; Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 34 (1965); Dickinson,
supra note 6, at 440, 563-64.
24. See United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. 189, 191, 5 Wheat. 412, 417 (1820);
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7, arts. 14-19; Dickinson, supra note 6, at
563-72.
25. The Law of Nations is a synonym for international law, that body of rules
and regulations which governs the conduct of sovereigns in their relations with one
another. See The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18;
1 C. Hyde, supra note 17, § 1, at 1-2; 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law § 1, at 4-5
(8th ed. 1955).
26. The S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 70-71
(Moore, J., dissenting); 2 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law § 203, at 681
(1941); G. Mueller & E. Wise, International Criminal Law 8-9 (1965); 2 D. O'Connell, International Law 657-60 (2d ed. 1970).
27. Dickinson, supra note 6, at 569-70. Under article 19 of the Convention on the
High Seas, supra note 7, each signatory grants to the others the broad power to board
the ships of any signatory which are engaged in piracy in order to punish the offense.
The grant of power with respect to slavery, however, is far narrower. Article 13
requires each signatory to take steps to prevent and punish slave trading aboard ships
flying that signatory's flag. The article creates no rights of enforcement in signatories
regarding slavery in general.
28. The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, openedfor signatureJune 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299 (entered into force
Oct. 26, 1939); see Waddell, InternationalNarcotics Control, 64 Am. J. Int'l L. 310,
313 (1970). The United States is not a signatory of the 1936 Convention. U.S. Dep't
of State, Treaties in Force 315-18 (1981).
29. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936 (1968); Dickinson, supra note 6, at 519; see United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp.
1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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its laws committed by that State's nationals, wherever such offenses

are committed. 30 When a United States court attempts to give extra-

territorial application to a statute based upon the nationality principle, the question is therefore not one of its competence to prescribe

under international law, but of congressional intent to give the statute
such application. 31 Although there is a general presumption against

extraterritoriality, 32 it may be overcome through examination of the

legislative
history of the statute and the nature of the offense in33
volved.

30. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United States v.
Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 289 (5th Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. King, 552 F.2d
833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Layton,
509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3128 (1981); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113, 116 (E.D.N.Y.
1974); 1 C. Hyde, supra note 17, § 240, at 802-03; 2 J. Moore, Digest of International
Law § 202, at 255-56 (1906); 1 L. Oppenheim, supra note 25, § 145, at 330; 2 T.
Rutherford, Institutes of Natural Law 180 (3d ed. 1799).
31. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v. PerezHerrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134,
136 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In
King, the United States defendants argued that 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1976), as applied to
their acts of distributing heroin in Japan for unlawful importation into the United
States, was an unconstitutional extension of Congress's penal power. 552 F.2d at 850.
The court rejected this contention, stating that "[t]here is no constitutional bar to the
extraterritorial application of penal laws." Id. (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284

U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932)).

32. E.g., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922);
United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Egan, 501 F.
Supp. 1252, 1258 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
33. E.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922); see United States
v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136-37
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259 (5th Cir. 1978),
overruled on other grounds en bane, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078
n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980). United States v. Bowman is the
starting point for inferring extraterritoriality to Congressional penal legislation. The
defendant in Bowman was a United States national charged with conspiracy to
defraud a corporation in which the United States was a stockholder. He argued that
the statute under which he was indicted was inapplicable to him because the acts
alleged in the indictment occurred on the high seas and in Rio de Janeiro. 260 U.S. at
96-97. The Supreme Court reversed a district court opinion that had quashed the
indictment. The Court distinguished between crimes against individuals and crimes
against the sovereignty of the State. As to the former, the presumption against
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The third basis of international jurisdiction is the principle of passive personality, which confers jurisdiction upon a State when one of
its nationals is injured by the offense. 34 This principle, accepted by
some states but rejected by others, is regarded as an auxiliary basis of
competence.3 5 The United States does not assert jurisdiction based
nor does it accept such asserupon the passive personality principle,
36
tion of jurisdiction by other States.
The territorial principle is the fourth basis of jurisdiction available
to a State under international law. Territoriality is the fundamental

principle of jurisdiction 37 and is accepted by all nations. 38 The ra-

tionale underlying the principle is that within its territorial limits, the
competence of the sovereign to define and punish offenses is absolute. 39 The United States adheres to the "objective" view of territoriality, 40 which confers jurisdiction upon a State over offenses commitextraterritoriality applies. With regard to the latter, however, the same rule should
not govern. Id. at 97-98. The government's right to protect itself against obstruction
or fraud was deemed to justify an inference of extraterritoriality where necessary.
Limiting the locus of these statutes to the "strictly territorial jurisdiction would be
greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large
immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign
countries as at home." Id. at 98.
34. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
884 (1967); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 & n.5 (N.D. Cal.),
appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3128 (1981);
United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aJJ'd in part,
reo'd in part on other grounds sub noma. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549
n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
35. Dickinson, supra note 6, at 445, 578-79; see United States v. Layton, 509 F.
Supp. 212, 216 & n.5 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3128 (1981). In Layton, the district court, though acknowledging
that jurisdiction was available based upon, inter alia, passive personality, stated that
it was unsure whether nationality of the victim alone would be a sufficient basis for
the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 216 n.5.
36. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
30(2) (1965); 2 G. Hackworth, supra note 26, § 135, at 179-80; 2 J. Moore, supra
note 30, § 201, at 228; 6 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 103-05 (1968);
see United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979).
37. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909); The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 74, 85, 7 Cranch 116, 136 (1812); Yenkichl Ito v.
United States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1933); J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 232 (5th
ed. 1955); 2 J. Moore, supra note 30, § 200, at 225-26, § 202, at 243, 263.
38. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Dickinson, supra note 6, at 480.
39. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 74, 85, 7 Cranch 116, 136
(1812); Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234 (1804); FTC v. Compagnie
De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
40. E.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 623-24 (1927); Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th
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ted outside its territory which are intended 4to cause and actually do
cause an adverse effect within the territory. '
A corollary of the territorial principle is the law of the flag theory,
which governs the jurisdiction of a nation over its ships wherever
located. 42 Although this jurisdictional basis has been treated as falling under the nationality principle, 43 the Supreme Court has placed it
within the territorial principle. 44 Thus, a ship is constructively
deemed a part of the territory of the sovereign whose flag she flies . 4
The Supreme Court first applied objective territoriality as a basis of
jurisdiction in Strassheim v. Daily.46 The defendant committed all
Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds en banc, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-52 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d
8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d
882, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
41. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 622-24 (1927); Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358-59 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 (E.D. Pa.
1980); see Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
18 (1965); 1 C. Hyde, supra note 17, § 238.
42. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-85 (1953); United States v. Flores,
289 U.S. 137, 155 (1933); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); United
States v. Hayes, 479 F. Supp. 901, 911-12 (D.P.R. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981). When a ship is within the territorial
jurisdiction of another State, the flag State retains jurisdiction, absent an assertion of
jurisdiction by the local sovereign or a controlling treaty provision. United States v.
Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 159 (1933); cf. Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 18 (1887) (United
States treaty with Belgium allows Belgium to assert jurisdiction over crimes committed aboard a United States vessel in Belgian port, if crime is of such a nature as to
disturb the public peace).
43. United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 488-89 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 811091, slip op. at 5363 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 1981); Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §§ 28-29, 31 (1965); see W. LaFave and A. Scott,
Handbook on Criminal Law 109 (1972).
44. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289
U.S. 137, 155-57 (1933); see United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922).
45. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289
U.S. 137, 155 (1933); see United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97 (1922); United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hayes, 479 F.
Supp. 901, 911 (D.P.R. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 653 F.2d
8, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1981); George, ExtraterritorialApplication of Penal Legislation, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 609, 613 (1966).
46. 221 U.S. 280 (1911). The defendant sold old machinery to the State of
Michigan, fraudulently representing that it was new. Id. at 282. The governor of
Michigan sought to have Daily extradited from Illinois as a fugitive from justice. The
district court issued a writ of habeas corpus saying Daily was not subject to the laws
of Michigan. Id. at 281.
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his acts of fraud against the state of Michigan while he was in Illinois. 47 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, held that the defendant, Daily, was subject to the laws of Michigan: "Acts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if
he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting
him within its power."' 48 Although Strassheim dealt only with domestic law, 49 Justice Holmes' enunciation of the objective territorial
principle has become the foundation for the United States' use of the
principle to assert jurisdiction over acts done outside the country that
have the requisite adverse effect within the United States.50
When the act proscribed is intended to take effect within the United
States but the actual effect does not occur, jurisdiction must be based
upon the protective theory of international law.5 1 Protective jurisdiction is conferred over acts committed without the State that threaten
the security of the State or the operation of its governmental functions. s2 The concept of protective jurisdiction is justified by the
State's need
to be able to punish conduct that threatens its very
existence.5 3
47. Id. at 285.
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 281. The defendant was indicted under Michigan law for bribery and
obtaining money by false pretenses. Id.
50. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-21 (1927); United States
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862. 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United
States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other
grounds en bane, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 980-81 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548-49 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 3128 (1981); United States v.
Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F.
Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836
(1st Cir. 1980).
52. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968);
United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v.
Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978), affd sub nom. United States v. Arra,
630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487 (S.D.
Cal. 1960) aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Rocha v. United
States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 9,8 (1961). But see Rivard v.
United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 & n.7 (5th Cir.) (implying injury to national
interest is required to invoke the principle), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
53. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804); United States
v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491, 494 (S.D. Cal. 1960), afJ'd in part, reo'd in part
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Common-law preference for the territorial basis of jurisdiction, 5

however, led the United States to make little use of the protective
principle,55 and the general rule remained that for a State to have
jurisdiction the effect of the crime had to be felt within the territory.s
What use was made of the principle was in the area of offenses against
the sovereign qua sovereign . 5 In other cases where it might have
been applied, courts either confused the protective principle with
objective territoriality or neglected to assert protective jurisdiction
even when it was clearly available.58
on other grounds sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); G. Mueller & E. Wise, supra note 26, at 68, 70. In
Rodriguez, the court stated that "the concept of essential sovereignty of a free nation
clearly requires the existence and recognition of an inherent power in the state to
protect itself from destruction... .[A] crime against the sovereignty of the state,
[attacks] the very existence of the state [and] provides authority to Congress to
prohibit its commission." 182 F. Supp. at 491-94.
54. 6 M. Whiteman, supra note 36, at 97-98; see United States v. Rodriguez, 182
F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D. Cal. 1960), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
948 (1961); G. Mueller & E. Wise, supra note 26, at 57.
55. United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978), affd sub nom.
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980); Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 33 reporter's note (1965); 6 M. Whiteman, supra note 36, at 97-98; Dickinson, supra note 6, at 54344. The protective
principle was first recognized by the Supreme Court in dictum in Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). In Church, the insurers of a ship put in a nonliability clause for seizure of an American ship by the Portuguese while engaged in
illicit trade. Id. at 187. The ship was seized off the South American coast by a
Portuguese warship. The claimant argued that the seizure was unjustified because
the ship was not actually engaged in trade at the time and therefore the insurer
should be liable. Id. at 232. Upholding the right of the insurers to refuse payment,
the Court said a nation's power "to secure itself from injury may certainly be
exercised beyond the limits of its territory. . . .Any attempt to violate the laws made
to protect this right, is an injury to itself which it may prevent." Id. at 234-35.
56. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909);
Yenkichi Ito v. United States, 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762
(1933); United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Address of
John Marshall to House of Representatives 12, reprinted in 18 U.S. app. 201, 205, 5
Wheat. app. note 1, at 12 (1820).
57. See United States ex rel. Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146, 147 (7th Cir. 1933)
(false statements by alien in passport application while outside United States sufficient for jurisdiction); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708, 709 (S.D. Cal. 1943)
(same).
58. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960), affd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); United States v.Baker, 136 F. Supp.
546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In Rodriguez, the district court asserted jurisdiction over the
defendants' false statements made outside the United States, 182 F. Supp. at 494, as
part of a "sham marriage" plan to gain entry into the United States. Id. at 482. In
asserting jurisdiction, the court confused the objective territorial and protective
principles, stating that the former was present when the adverse effect required by
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In 1968, the Second Circuit in United States v. Pizzarusso5 resolved
the confusion manifested in prior cases and reaffirmed the distinction
between the protective and objective territorial principles.00 In Pizzarusso, an alien defendant made false statements in Canada when

applying for an immigrant visa to enter the United States. 0 ' The
circuit court held that the trial court properly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction, despite the absence of any allegation in the indictment
that the defendant had entered the country. 2 Without this allegation, jurisdiction could not be based upon objective territoriality.0 3
The court found, however, that the crime of falsely filling out application papers constituted "an affront to the very sovereignty of the
United States"0 4 and therefore supported an assertion of jurisdiction
based upon the protective principle.0 5

Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), was felt by private persons or their
property, but the latter governed where the adverse effect was felt by the sovereign.
182 F. Supp. at 488. By equating Strassheim with protective jurisdiction, the court
neglected the fundamental distinction between the objective territorial and protective theories; the former requires an actual adverse effect within the State, see supra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text, the latter requires only a threat directed at the
sovereignty of the State. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. In United
States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), the issue was whether the district
court had jurisdiction to try an alien defendant for falsifying immigration papers
while in Canada in order to gain entry into the United States. Id. at 547. The court
declined to assert jurisdiction, stating that because the crime was "complete the
moment she made the false statement," id. at 548-49, no acts essential to the offense
occurred within the United States, as required by Strassheim. Id. at 548 (citing
Strassheim v. Daily, 22 U.S. 280, 285 (1911)). Clearly, however, protective jurisdiction was present, because the crime posed a threat to a governmental function. See
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
59. 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968). In this case, the
defendant was convicted under a statute that imposed criminal liability upon aliens
for committing acts of perjury at United States consulates abroad. The issue on
appeal was whether the court had jurisdiction over the offense. Id. at 8-10.
60. Id. at 10-11. Under the statute in question, entry into the United States was
not an element of the offense. Therefore, the court concluded that enforcement had
to be based upon the protective principle, which requires that acts done outside a
State have a "potentially adverse effect" upon the security or governmental functions
of the State. Only if "the statute [were] re-drafted and entry made a part of the crime
[would we] be presented with a clear case of jurisdiction under the objective territorial principle." Id. at 11.
61. Id. at 9. The defendant, Jean Pizzarusso, willfully made a number of false
statements in her "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" at the
American Consulate in Montreal, Canada. Among her false statements was a claim,
material to the ultimate disposition of her application, that she had never been
arrested. Id.
62. Id. The defendant did enter the United States after the issuance of her visa,
but the court felt this occurrence was immaterial to the question of jurisdiction. Id.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id. at 11.

1982]

JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS

699

In Pizzarusso, the requisite threat to the security of the United

States was inherent in the very nature of the crime committed. 0 In

high seas narcotics cases, however, the directness of the attack upon

security or governmental functions becomes less clear, usually because
the vessel seized is hundreds of miles from the United States, is not
67 Most
flying a United States flag and is crewed by foreign nationals.
courts applying protective jurisdiction in these cases have done so

implicitly, without reference to the sovereignty of the United States,"
although there was evidence in each case that the defendant's activity

was directed towards the United States. 6 9

At least one court, however, has explicitly stated that narcotics

smuggling fits squarely within the class of crimes ordinarily covered
by the protective principle. In United States v. Egan,70 alien defendants 71 were charged with conspiracies to import and to possess with
the intent to distribute marijuana.72 The court based jurisdiction
upon the protective principle, stating that "[t]he unlawful importa-

tion of drugs bypasses the federal customs laws, and thus directly
challenges a governmental function." 73 Accordingly, the court held
"that the drug laws charged in the indictment do apply to the defendants' activities.
high seas." 4

. .

even though such activities took place solely on the

66. Id. at 9-10. The visa was for entry into the United States. By definition,
therefore, it could present a threat to the sovereignty of no other State. See id.
67. E.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128, 1130 (5th Cir.) (125 to
150 miles, no flag, Colombian crew), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United
States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933, 935-36 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (350 miles, no flag,
foreign crew); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y.) (200 miles,
Panamanian flag, British crew), af'd, No. 81-1091, slip op. at 5363 (2d Cir. Nov. 23,
1981); United States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (135 miles,
no flag, crew not specified).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 483-84
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 81-1091, slip op. at 5363 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 1981); United
States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 394-96 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
69. United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (5th Cir.) (charts marked
with rendezvous point off Texas coast), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United
States v. Streifel, 507 F. Supp. 480, 482 (S.D.N.Y.) (ship first sighted in Gulf of
Maine, 50 miles from United States coast, took evasive action when approached by
Coast Guard), aff'd, No. 81-1091, slip op. at 5363 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 1981); United
States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 393-94 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (charts marked with
rendezvous point off Texas coast).
70. 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In this case, the Coast Guard boarded a
stateless vessel that was approximately 40 miles south of Montauk, Long Island. The
crew was arrested after a search of the vessel revealed 30 tons of marijuana in the
hold. Id. at 1256.
71. Id. There were also two American defendants aboard the vessel, over whom
jurisdiction existed based upon the nationality principle. Id. at 1258.
72. Id. at 1256.
73. Id. at 1258 (citation omitted).
74. Id. at 1261.
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In its attempts to control unlawful trafficking in narcotics, Con-

gress has enacted statutes that enable courts to assert jurisdiction
within principles of international law. 7 - Courts in their earlier appli-

cations of these statutes required a sufficient nexus with the United
States to establish objective territorial jurisdiction.76 In recent cases,
however, courts have relied increasingly upon the protective principle
as the sole basis of jurisdiction. 77 Relaxation of jurisdictional requirements, while enabling courts to punish narcotics smugglers otherwise
beyond the reach of United States law, has created the potential for

assertions of jurisdiction that exceed the parameters of international
law.
II.

HIGH SEAS NARCOTICS PROSECUTIONS PRIOR TO SECTION

955a

A. Inadequacy of the Existing Statutes
A dramatic increase in high seas narcotics smuggling during the
1970's71 led to the realization that the substantive statutes then in
force were inadequate as a means to punish smugglers.7 0 These pro-

scriptions are contained in a series of statutes enacted as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.80
Section 841(a)(1) of Title 21 of the United States Code prohibits
possession of a controlled substance with the intent that it be distributed, with no requirement as to the ultimate location of the intended

75. See infra pt. II (A).
76. E.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (5th
Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds en banc, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982-83 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
77. E.g., United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla, 632 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1707 (1981); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 112829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp.
1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
78. See House Report, supra note 1, at 4; Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra
note 1, at 119 (statement of Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard,
Chief, Office of Operations, Dep't of Transp.). In 1973, the Coast Guard, in conjunction with other agencies, seized 7 vessels carrying a total of $4.79 million worth
of controlled substances. In 1978, 138 vessels were seized, carrying approximately
$1.2 billion worth of contraband. Id.
79. House Report, supra note 1, at 4-5; Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra
note 1, at 102-03 (statement of Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard,
Chief, Office of Operations, Dep't of Transp.); Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 34 (statement of Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U. S.
Coast Guard).
80. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified in scattered sections throughout
U.S.C.).
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distribution."' Unlawful importation of a controlled substance into
the United States is prohibited by section 952(a) of Title 21;82 manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance with the intent or
knowledge that it will be unlawfully
imported is prohibited under
83

section 959 of the same tile.

The major weakness in these substantive statutes is that they are not
directed at the conduct responsible for the increased flow of drugs into
the United States-the possession of a large quantity of narcotics on
the high seas with the intent that they be distributed within the
United States. 4 Although this type of conduct is proscribed under
section 841(a)(1), that statute was not originally intended to have
extraterritorial application; 5 attempts to apply it to vessels on the

81. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1976). Subsection (a) provides in pertinent part: "Except as
authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally. . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Id. § 841(a)(1).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976). The statute provides in part: "Itshall be unlawful
to import into the customs territory of the United States from any place outside
thereof (but within the United States), or to import into the United States from any
place outside thereof, any controlled substance." Id.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1976). The statute proscribes acts of manufacture or distribution committed abroad which are directed at the United States. It states in full: "it
shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance
in Schedule I or II-(1) intending that such substance will be unlawfully imported
into the United States; or (2) knowing that such substance will be unlawfully imported into the United States. This section is intended to reach acts of manufacture or
distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Any
person who violates this section shall be tried in the United States district court at the
point of entry where such person enters the United States, or in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia." Id.
84. See House Report, supra note 1, at 4-6; Coast Guard Drug Interdiction,
supra note 1, at 102-03 (statement of Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast
Guard, Chief, Office of Operations, Dep't of Transp.); Coast Guard Drug Law
Enforcement, supra note 2, at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
85. See Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra note 1, at 169 (statement of W.
Gordon Fink, Ass't Adm'r for Intelligence, U.S. Dep't of Justice); Stopping "Mother
Ships"--A Loophole in Drug Enforcement: Hearings on S.3437 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 42 (1978) (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Adm'r, Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as Stopping
Mother Ships]. Section 841(a)(1) is included in Title II of the Comprehensive Act,
which relates generally to domestic control and enforcement. Pub. L. No. 91-513,
tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 21 & 42 U.S.C.). By
contrast § 952(a) and § 963 are contained in Title III of the Act, which relates
specifically to export and import of controlled substances. Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit.
III, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in scattered sections throughout U.S.C.). Although
this difference does not preclude extraterritorial application of § 841(a)(1), it is
nevertheless relevant as an indication of congressional intent. See United States v.
Gomez-Tostado, 597 F.2d 170, 172-73 (9th Cir. 1979).
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high seas engaged in smuggling have been infrequent and have met
with limited success. 86 Moreover, although section 952(a) must of
necessity apply to importation offenses begun extraterritorially, 87 the
section does not become operative until actual importation takes
place.8 8 This provision is, therefore, of little use in attempts to apprehend and punish smugglers before their cargo reaches the territorial
United States. Unlike sections 841(a)(1) and 952(a), section 959 is
expressly intended to have extraterritorial application.8 9 Nevertheless, this statute is also unsuited to high seas narcotics smuggling. In its
prohibition of manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance
with intent or knowledge that it will be unlawfully imported, the
statute has its greatest applicability to acts committed in foreign countries.90 On the high seas, however, narcotics are stored in the hold of

86. See United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v.
Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 135-36 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. May May, 470 F. Supp.
384, 386-87 (S.D. Tex. 1979). In United States v. May May, the defendants were
arrested approximately 135 miles from the United States and charged with, inter
alia, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). 470 F. Supp. at 392. At the close of
the government's case-in-chief, the court instructed the jury that it would have to
return a verdict of not guilty on that charge. Id. at 387.
87. United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289,
290 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954, 957 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977).
88. See United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 758 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 882 (1980); United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980); United States v. Soto, 591 F.2d 1091, 1104 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979). The definition of import for purposes of §
952(a) is contained in § 951(a)(1): "The term 'import' means, with respect to any
article, any bringing in or introduction of such article into any area (whether or not
such bringing in or introduction constitutes an importation within the meaning of the
tariff laws of the United States)." 21 U.S.C. § 951(a)(1) (1976). In Soto, the defendants were charged with conspiracies to import and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, as well as actual importation and possession with intent to distribute.
591 F.2d at 1094. The court reversed the convictions for conspiracy to import and
actual importation because the evidence was insufficient to show the marijuana had
been brought into the United States from without the territory. Id, at 1104-05.
89. 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1976); see United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-52 &
n.24 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Egan, 501 F.
Supp. 1252, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
90. See, e.g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1976)
(American nationals convicted of violating § 959 while in Thailand and Japan), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); United States v. Hayes, 479 F. Supp. 901, 910 (D.P.R.
1979) ("[s]ection 959, however, was enacted to encompass acts committed in foreign
countries obviously under the theory of protective jurisdiction" (emphasis in original)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 653 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113, 115-16 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (United States
national indicted for distribution of controlled substance in Thailand; motion to
dismiss denied).
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a ship; the act of manufacture has been completed and there are no
acts of distribution taking place. 9 '
The difficulties with existing substantive narcotics statutes forced
prosecutors to charge conspiracies to commit these offenses in order to
be able to punish narcotics smugglersY2 Section 846 of Title 21
prohibits conspiracies to possess a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.9 3 With identical language, section 963 of Title 21 prohibits conspiracies to import a controlled substance and to manufacture or distribute it 9 with
the intent or knowledge that it will be
4
unlawfully imported.

For the government to obtain a conviction for conspiracy to commit
a narcotics offense, all that need be shown is that the conspirators had
agreed to commit an offense 95 and had the culpable mental state
required for the underlying offense.96 Under sections 846 and 963,
therefore, the government must prove that the defendants had intent
or knowledge that their acts take effect within the United States.9 7 It
91. Stopping Mother Ships, supra note 85, at 42 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger,
Adm'r, Drug Enforcement Adm'n, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
92. House Report, supra note 1, at 5; Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement,
supra note 2, at 32 (statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman); id. at 34 (statement of
Admiral John B. Hayes, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Dep't of Transp.); id. at
60-64 (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Ass't U.S. Att'y, Chief, Grim. Div., S.D.
Fla.); e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 865 (5th Cir.) (§§ 846, 963), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir.
1978) (§§ 846, 963), overruled on other grounds en banc, United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058,
1061 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (§ 963), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir.) (§ 963), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). This statute proscribes attempts or conspiracies to
violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(1976). It provides in full: "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for
the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1976).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976). This statute proscribes attempts or conspiracies to
violate, inter alia, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 959 (1976): "Any person who attempts or
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subehapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for
the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21
U.S.C. § 963 (1976).
95. See lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); Ingram v. United
States, 360 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1959); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1270
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Bright, 550 F.2d 240,
241 (5th Cir. 1977).
96. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959); United States v.
McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 873 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Malatesta, 590
F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979); United States
v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. DeWeese, 632
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is not necessary that the underlying substantive offense be completed. 98 Thus, the government may charge a conspiracy to violate
sections 841(a)(1), 952(a) or 959 and obtain a conviction without
showing that the possession, importation, manufacture or distribution

proscribed by those statutes has occurred. 9 By taking advantage of
the lesser standard that must be met for a conspiracy offense rather
than proving the underlying substantive offense, the government has
smugglers for possession of
been able to punish high seas narcotics
00
narcotics with the intent to distribute.

B. Relaxation of Substantive and JurisdictionalRequirements
The narcotics conspiracy statutes, sections 846 and 963, differ from
the general federal conspiracy statute 1° ' in that they do not explicitly
F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981);
United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Ricardo,
619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v.
Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States
v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. May May, 470
F. Supp. 384, 396 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
98. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); United States v. Sellmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Waldron, 590 F.2d
33, 34 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 934 (1979); United States v. Fruehauf Corp.,
577 F.2d 1038, 1071 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v.
McKnight, 439 F. Supp. 536, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
99. See United States v. Lee, 622 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United
States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832
(1979); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1269-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla, 632 F.2d
1161, 1171 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1707 (1981); United States v.
Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1132 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United
States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994
(1981); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 891 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1266 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled
on other grounds en banc, United States v. Williams. 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 825 (1975).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976). The conspiracy statute proscribes conspiracies to
commit federal offenses or to defraud the United States. It provides in pertinent part:
"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for
any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy." Id. (emphasis added).
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require the government to allege or prove as an essential element of

the offense that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was
committed by a conspirator.10 2 Nevertheless, many courts proceeded

on the assumption that an overt act was required,' 0 3 while others,
although acknowledging04 that an overt act was not required, found

that one had occurred.

In United States v. Rodriguez,'0 s the Fifth Circuit attempted to

resolve the confusion surrounding interpretation of the two conspiracy
statutes. The appellants in Rodriguez were convicted of conspiracies

to import and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana.'10

They

were operating out of Florida as part of a plan to smuggle marijuana

into the United States from Colombia. 07 The conviction for conspiracy to import was based upon direct evidence of meetings between the
conspirators and undercover agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration.' 0°

The distribution conspiracy was proven by circumstan-

tial evidence; the tremendous amount of marijuana being imported
allowed an inference that it was intended for distribution.'0 9

The

Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected appellants' contentions that the
102. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) (overt act required) with 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1976) (no such requirement) and 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976) (same).
103. E.g., United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Byers, 600 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 445 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 1004 (1975).
104. E.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 886-87 & n.39 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978); United States v. Dryer, 533 F.2d 112, 117 (3d Cir.
1976).
105. 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), aff'd sub non. Albernaz v. United
States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
106. United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1238 (5th Cir. 1978), affd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub
nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
107. Id. at 1238-39. The appellants in Rodriguez were involved in the onshore
activities of the importation and distribution scheme. Id. The conspirators who were
bringing the marijuana from Colombia were arrested on the high seas, tried separately from the Rodriguez appellants and convicted. Their convictions were affirmed
in United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), ocerruled on other
grounds en banc, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir.
1980).
108. United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1978), ajJ'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), ajf'd
sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981). The appellants' conspiracy
had been infiltrated by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who represented to appellants that the agents could secure a vessel to enable them to transport
marijuana. Id. at 1238. The importation plans were made at a series of meetings
between the agents and appellants. Id.
109. Id. at 1246.
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consecutive sentences imposed for the convictions were improper. 10
In resolving the confusion shown in prior cases as to whether allegation and proof of an overt act is an essential element of a narcotics
conspiracy offense, the court expressly held that "these indictments do
not require allegation or proof of an overt act." ' "
An overt act itself is considered evidence of the conspiracy1 2 - an
agreement between two or more persons to commit an offense." 3 In
the absence of an overt act requirement, the existence of the agreement must be established through other direct or circumstantial evidence. 1 4 Mere presence at the scene of a crime is generally not
considered sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction;"" the accused's participation must be established by evidence eliminating any
reasonable hypothesis of innocence.1 6 In many high seas narcotics
conspiracies, the absence of an overt act requirement has been compensated for by other evidence such as incriminating statements by
defendants, 17 jettisoning of charts and papers after contact with the

110. United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906, 925 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd
sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
111. Id. at 919 n.37 (emphasis in original).
112. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); United States v. Gonzales,
617 F.2d 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139-40
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972).
113. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); United States v. Civella,
648 F.2d 1167, 1174 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981);
United States v. Boone, 641 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. MelchorLopez, 627 F.2d 886, 890 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 243
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Teal, 582 F.2d
343, 345 (5th Cir. 1978); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
114. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974); United States v.
Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846
(1979); United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1245, 1246 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd
sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
115. United States v. Dalzotto, 603 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Soto, 591 F.2d 1091, 1104 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 442 U.S. 930 (1979); United States
v. Littrell, 574 F.2d 828, 833 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Barrentine, 591 F.2d
1069, 1083 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979); see United States v. CalcedoAsprilla, 632 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1707 (1981);
United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir. 1978), afj'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds en banc, 612 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1980), ajf'd sub nom.
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981); United States v. Brown, 584 F.2d
252, 262 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258,
1271 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d
638, 640 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
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Coast Guard, 1 8 or participation in the transfer of narcotics."19 Thus,

in United States v. Thomas,120 the circuit court, while acknowledging
that an overt act is not required under section 963 for a conspiracy to

import marijuana,12 1 concluded that fourteen meetings between the
defendants and undercover DEA agents were abundant evidence of
the existence of a conspiracy.122
Recent decisions, however, have affirmed high seas narcotics con-

spiracy convictions while nearly abandoning traditional conspiracy
theory and making presence on a ship laden with narcotics sufficient
evidence on which to base a conspiracy conviction. United States v.

DeWeese 12 3 and United States v. Freeman 2 4 were two prosecutions
arising out of the seizure of a United States-registered vessel.'

The

captain of the vessel, DeWeese, and the crew members were convicted
in separate trials under section 963 of conspiracy to import marijuana

into the United States in violation of section 952(a). 2 6
On his appeal, Captain DeWeese argued that there was insufficient

evidence to establish his participation in a conspiracy.12
Rejecting
this contention, the court stated that the probable length of the voy-

age, the large quantity of marijuana on board, and the necessarily
close relationship of the captain and crew were factors from which the

jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'2

The court ac-

118. See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 866 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla, 632 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1707 (1981); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252,
1265 (5th Cir. 1978), overruledon othergrounds en banc, United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n.18 (5th Cir. 1980).
120. 567 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
121. Id. at 641.
122. Id. at 640.
123. 632 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1981).
124. 660 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1981).
125. The vessel was boarded for a routine safety inspection near the Straits of
Yucatan, 250 miles from the United States. 632 F.2d at 1269. The ship was rigged for
shrimping, yet the gear appeared unused. When asked if the Coast Guard could
examine the hold of the ship, DeWeese replied, "Sure, but you're not going to like
what you find." The inspection revealed over 41,000 pounds of marijuana. Id.
126. United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981) (crew members); United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1268-69 (5th Cir. 1980) (DeWeese),
cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981).
127. 632 F.2d at 1269. DeWeese also argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because there was no evidence that the agreement to conspire or any overt act
occurred within the United States. Id. at 1271. The court rejected this argument,
saying proof that the conspiracy was directed at the United States was sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction. Id. at 1271-72.
128. Id. at 1272 (citing United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980)).
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cepted the government's argument that no one would attempt to
smuggle eight million dollars worth of marijuana from Colombia into
the United States without prearranged assistance. 20
In the Freeman trial, the crew of the ship also argued that there
was insufficient evidence upon which to base a conspiracy conviction. 13 The Freeman court, however, rejected this argument and in
affirming the conspiracy conviction' 3 ' extended the holding of DeWeese. The evidence showed that the defendant crew members were
not informed by Captain DeWeese of the purpose of their voyage until
after they had left United States territory.1 32 There was thus no
evidence of a conspiracy being formed by these defendants while in
the United States or at sea. The court inferred the existence of a
conspiracy from the three factors discussed in DeWeese 3 3 and held
sufficient in themselves to establish a prima facie
that the three were 34
case of conspiracy.

The ramifications of these holdings were the focus of a special
concurrence by Chief Judge Godbold who wrote that, after DeWeese,
"every officer and every crewman on every fishing and shrimping
boat that makes a 'long voyage' . . . in the Gulf or Atlantic is now

prima facie a conspirator if a large quantity of contraband is found
aboard the vessel."'135 Thus, despite clear precedent to the contrary, 136 DeWeese and Freeman would allow participation in the
conspiracy to be inferred from mere presence and knowledge.
Paralleling the relaxation of the substantive standards necessary for
a conspiracy offense was a trend towards abolition of the overt act as a
requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. Prior to this shift, an
overt act within the United States was either assumed to be required
or, although not required, was found to be present. 137 Courts thus
relied on objective territorial jurisdiction, either by itself, 138 or in

129. Id.
130. 660 F.2d at 1034.
131. Id. at 1037.
132. Id. at 1032.
133. Id. at 1035. The three factors were the probable length of the voyage, the
large quantity of marijuana aboard the ship and the necessarily close relationship
between captain and crew. United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1272 (5th Cir.
1980) (citing United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 938 (1980)), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981).
134. 660 F.2d at 1035-36.
135. Id. at 1038 (Godbold, C.J., concurring).
136. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1258 (5th Cir. 1978),
overruled on other grounds en banc, United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078
n.18 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
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conjunction with nationality 139 or law of the flag jurisdiction.

40

With

the abolition of the overt act as a jurisdictional requirement, however,
came a willingness to rely upon the protective principle as the sole
basis of jurisdiction in high seas narcotics cases.' 41
In United States v. Williams,142 the defendant appealed his conviction under section 963 for conspiracy to import marijuana, arguing
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the offense because no

overt act had occurred within the United States. 143 The defendant's

Panamanian ship was first spotted in Colombian waters and was

subsequently boarded in international waters. A search of the hold
revealed 21,680 pounds of marijuana.' 44 The Fifth Circuit rejected

Williams' argument, holding "that proof of an overt act within the
judicial district is not a prerequisite for district court jurisdiction. Any

other result would have the anomalous requirement that more be
shown for jurisdiction than is necessary for conviction of the

crime."' 145 During the pendency of a rehearing of Williams,4 4 the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Postal147 affirmed three convictions

139. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979);
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 980 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1981); United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
141. See United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla, 632 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 1707 (1981); United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 112829 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v.Cortes, 588 F.2d
106, 107 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. May May, 470 F. Supp. 384, 396 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
142. 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979), af'd en bane, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. Id. at 213.
144. Id. at 212. The ship was boarded by the Coast Guard only after receipt of
permission to do so from the Panamanian Embassy. Id.
145. Id. at 213. Although it may have been anomalous for this court to require
more for jurisdiction than for the substantive offense, it is not incorrect in terms of
international law. Before a State may prosecute and convict for an offense, it must
have an accepted basis of international jurisdiction for doing so. See supra note 13
and accompanying text. Thus, if an American national is murdered in France by a
French national, this certainly constitutes murder under American law. Yet there is
no international basis of jurisdiction over the offense, because the United States
rejects the passive personality principle. See United States v. Columba-Colella, 604
F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
146. Williams filed petitions for a rehearing and a rehearing en banc; the petition
for rehearing en bane was granted on July 16, 1979. United States v. Williams, 600
F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane). Upon rehearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
Williams' conviction. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc).
147. 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
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under sections 846 and 963 for conspiracy to import marijuana and
conspiracy to possess it with intent to distribute. 48 In Postal, the
defendants' foreign-registered vessel had been seized in international
waters; 149 they argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the
offense.'5 O The court said overt acts that had occurred within the
United States gave objective territorial jurisdiction,' 5' then added in
dictum that the result of recent conspiracy decisions could well be
"that the proof of an overt act within the United States is no longer
required for jurisdictional purposes
and that mere proof of intended
' 52
territorial effects is sufficient."'

The significance of the decisions in Williams and Postal is in the
willingness to base jurisdiction over high seas narcotics offenses upon
the protective principle. Proof of intended territorial effects, which
was required as an essential element of all the substantive and conspiracy statutes,. 3 wotld thus also serve as the sole basis of international
subject matter jurisdiction. ' 4 Such became evident in United States
v. May May,

55

in which the alien defendants' stateless vessel was

seized on the high seas 135 miles from the United States coast.

50

It

148. Id. at 865.
149. Id. at 867-68. The defendants' vessel was boarded twice by the Coast Guard
in order to ascertain her nationality. The first boarding took place 10.5 miles from
the United States coast. Id. at 866. When the defendants produced a Grand Cayman
registry, the Coast Guard withdrew. Id. at 867. After consultation with officials in
Miami, the Coast Guard officers boarded again, this time seizing the vessel and
arresting the crew. Id. at 867-68.
150. Id. at 885.
151. Id. at 886-87. The indictment alleged the purchase of the ship in Florida as
an overt act under both conspiracy counts. Id. at 886. The court rejected defendants'
argument that the conspiracy had not been formed when the ship was purchased. Id.
at 887. Defendants' setting sail for South America the day after the ship was delivered ruled out any reasonable hypothesis that the ship was bought for innocent
purposes. Id.
152. Id. at 886 n.39.
153. This requirement was either present in the statute itself, see supra notes 83,
93-94, or, as in the case of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), was imposed judicially. E.g.,
United States v. Hayes, 653 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker, 609
F.2d 134, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
154. E.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd en
banc, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980); see United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 671
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (dictum), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United
States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dictum). But see United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that question still open
as to whether mere proof of intended territorial effects is sufficient for district court
jurisdiction).
155. 470 F. Supp. 384 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
156. Id. at 392.
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had never entered United States waters,'

the United States had taken

place.' 5 8

57

and no overt acts within

The court denied the defend-

ants' motion to dismiss the indictments, 3 9 which charged conspiracy

to import marijuana and conspiracy to possess it with intent to distribute. 160

That all the events in the conspiracy occurred outside the

territorial United States was held to be irrelevant to the question of a
court's jurisdiction as long as the government could demonstrate that
the extraterritorial acts were intended to have an impact within the
United States. 16 1 The intended territorial effects were established
through charts marked with a rendezvous point off the coast of Texas

and the evasive actions that were taken by the defendants' vessel after

contact with the Coast Guard.' 62 The court said that its holding fully

comported with the somewhat expansive viewpoint of jurisdiction
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in narcotics conspiracies, believing, as

did the Williams court, that to require more 6for
jurisdiction than for
3
the substantive offense would be anomalous.'

In United States v. Ricardo, 6 4 the court extended the protective

principle even further than had the May May court. The defendants

in Ricardo were five Colombian nationals '6 5 arrested aboard a state-6
less vessel approximately 125 to 150 miles from the Texas coast.'1
Their convictions on conspiracy charges under section 963 were upheld, though no overt acts within or without the United States were
alleged or proved.' 6 7 The court claimed it had objective territorial
jurisdiction, 6 but clearly it was basing jurisdiction on a very broad

assertion of the protective principle.' 69 The only proof of intended

157. Id. at 394.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 396.
160. Id. at 386.
161. Id. at 395.
162. Id. at 394-96.
163. Id.; see supra note 145 and accompanying text.
164. 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980).
165. Id. at 1126. There were two United States nationals aboard the vessel, as to
whom nationality jurisdiction was also present. See id. at 1127.
166. Id. at 1128.
167. Id. The circumstances of the case, including charts seized when the vessel
was boarded, indicated the plan was conceived outside the United States. Id. at
1127.
168. Id. at 1128-29. The court reiterated that the United States traditionally
adheres to the objective territorial principle, which requires an overt act within the
territory for jurisdiction. Id. at 1128. The court stated, however, that it would
contravene the purpose of the narcotics statutes if they applied extraterritorially only
when an overt act occurred within the territory. Id. at 1129. The court thus said
"[t]he fact that appellants intended the conspiracy to be consummated within the
territorial boundaries satisfies jurisdictional requisites." Id.
169. See id.at 1128-29.
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territorial effects consisted of charts marked with a rendezvous point
70

in international waters sixty miles outside United States territory. '

Analysis of the foregoing cases reveals a steady lessening of the

evidence considered necessary both for conspiracy offenses and for
subject matter jurisdiction. Often in these cases some overt act or
adverse effect within the United States, though not required, has been

present,' 7' thus conferring objective territorial jurisdiction upon the

court. In other cases, the nationality of the defendant' 72 or the United
States registry of the ship

73

has provided an additional basis of inter-

national subject matter jurisdiction. When no such act or effect has
been shown, or one of the other international principles has not been
applicable, protective jurisdiction has always been present because the
applicable statutes all require as an essential element of74the offense

that the act proscribed be directed at the United States.

With the enactment of section 955a(a) of Title 21, however, Con-

gress has proscribed possession with intent to distribute, regardless of
the location of the intended distribution or the nationality of the
accused.'75 This statute, therefore, differs from existing statutes by

purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the federal court without any
allegation or proof whatsoever that the distribution proscribed is to
have an effect within the United States.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL

Dmcr

CONTAINED IN SECTION 955a(a)

The legislative history of section 955a of Title 21 of the United
States Code' 76 indicates that the statute was originally intended to
170. Id. at 1127.
171. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
172. E.g., United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 670 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 289 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 135 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,
977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v. Streifel, 507 F.
Supp. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, No. 81-1091, slip op. at 5363 (2d Cir. Nov. 23,
1981).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3250 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d 668, 669 (5th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United States v. PerezHerrera, 610 F.2d 289, 289 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134,
135-36 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v. Hayes, 479 F.
Supp. 901, 905 (D.P.R. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 653 F.2d
8 (1st Cir. 1981).
174. See supra notes 83, 93-94, 153 and accompanying text.
175. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981).
176. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a (West Supp. 1981). The statute provides in pertinent
part: "(a) It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on
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apply only to possession of narcotics by United States nationals or by
any national aboard vessels registered in the United States.'

7

During

the hearings on the proposed statute, however, testimony was heard
regarding the difficulty of prosecuting the foreign crew members of

stateless vessels who were engaged in narcotics smuggling.

78

Despite

the relaxation of the substantive and jurisdictional requirements

needed for conviction under existing statutes, 17 those statutes all re-

quired proof of intended territorial effects. 8 0 Because of the diffi-

culty of proving such intent, many indictments were thrown out, and
although the narcotics were destroyed and the ships impounded, the
smugglers themselves went free.' 8 ' As a result of these hearings,
section 955a, as enacted, is far broader than its sponsors had originally

planned. 182

Though Congress intended to give "maximum prosecutorial author-

ity under international law" 83 by enacting section 955a, nowhere did
it manifest a desire to override established principles of international
law. 8

4

Indeed, the legislative history of the statute is evidence of

board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, to
knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to
manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. (b) It is unlawful for a citizen of
the United States on board any vessel to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or
distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. (c) It is unlawful for any person on board any vessel within the customs
waters of the United States to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute,
or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. (d) It is
unlawful for any person to possess, manufacture, or distribute a controlled substance-(1) intending that it be unlawfully imported into the United States; or (2)
knowing that it will be unlawfully imported into the United States.'" Id.
177. House Report, supra note 1, at 4-5; Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra
note 1, at 273-79; see Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 29
(statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman); Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra
note 1, at 102-03 (statement of Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, U.S. Coast Guard,
Chief, Office of Operations, Dep't of Transp.).
178. House Report, supra note 1, at 5; Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement,
supra note 2, at 48 (statement of Peter B. Bensinger, Adm'r, Drug Enforcement
Adm'n, U.S. Dep't of Justice), id. at 55 (statement of Morris D. Busby, Dir., Office
of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, U.S. Dep't of State).
179. See supra pt. II(B).
180. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 60 (statement of
Michael P. Sullivan, Ass't U.S. Att'y, Chief, Crim. Div., S.D. Fla.).
181. S.Rep. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980); House Report, supra note 1,
at 5; Coast GuardDrug Law Enforcement, supra note 2 at 65 (statement of Michael
P. Sullivan, Ass't U.S. Att'y, Chief, Crim. Div., S.D. Fla.).
182. Compare21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(a) (West Supp. 1981) (proscribes possession of a
controlled substance by a foreign national aboard a stateless vessel on the high seas)
with H.R. 10371, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 39,113 (1977) (no such
proscription), reprintedin Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra note 1, at 273, and
H.R. 10698, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. 1,894 (1978) (same), reprintedin
Coast Guard Drug Interdiction, supra note 1, at 276.
183. S.Rep. No. 855, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
184. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

congressional intent to abide by that law. 85 Section 955a must therefore be construed within
established principles of international subject
88
matter jurisdiction.1

In enacting section 955a(a), Congress has created a statute that is
far easier for courts and prosecutors to apply in high seas narcotics
cases than are the statutes previously used in these situations. As
section 955a is expressly intended to have extraterritorial application, 8 7 courts no longer have to engage in the tortuous analysis necessary to infer that application in earlier prosecutions under the conspiracy statutes. 188 Removal of the requirement of showing intent to
distribute or import into the United States allows prosecutors to avoid
allegation and proof of intended territorial effects. 189 By omitting
this requirement, however, Congress has removed the essential element of prior statutes which permitted courts to base their holdings
upon protective jurisdiction.190 Such an omission creates the possibility that section 955a(a) may be applied in a manner that exceeds the
limits of that jurisdiction.
The majority of vessels seized while engaged in narcotics smuggling
are of United States registry.' 91 In these cases, application of section
955a(a) presents no international legal problems because jurisdiction
185. House Report, supra note 1, at 9; Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement,
supra note 2, at 10, 13-14 (Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Hon. John M. Murphy, Chm'n, House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries (Apr. 11, 1979)), id. at 16-18 (Letter from Mark G. Aron,
Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transp., to Hon. John M. Murphy, Chm'n,
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Apr. 20, 1979)). The proposed bill
to which these letters referred, H.R. 2538, included foreign vessels in the category of
"vessels subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Each letter pointed out that
the United States does not possess that type of jurisdiction under international law.
Id. at 11, 17. As a result of these letters, the proposed bill was amended, but no
requirement that distribution be intended for the United States was inserted.
186. United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
187. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(h) (West Supp. 1981). Subsection (h) expressly provides
that § 955a "is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or distribution
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Id.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (5th Cir.) (inferring extraterritorial application for §§ 846 and 963), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063
(1980); United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1980) (same
for § 963); United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1258-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same
for §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a) and 963); cf. United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,
216-21 (N.D. Cal.) (extraterritoriality inferred from statute proscribing conspiracy to
murder or to aid and abet murder of United States Congressman), appeal dismissed,
645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3128 (1981).
189. United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
United States v. Pauth-Arzuza, No. 80-577-Cr-CA, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20,
1981); House Report, supra note 1, at 9-10.
190. See supra notes 83, 93-94, 153 and accompanying text.
191. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 67 (statement of
Michael P. Sullivan, Ass't U.S. Att'y, Chief, Crim. Div., S.D. Fla.).
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is based on the principle of the law of the flag. 192 That theory makes
a ship constructively a part of the territory of the sovereign whose flag
she flies.19 3 As long as the manufacture or possession, and the intent

to distribute, which is inferable from the large quantity of narcotics
aboard,9 4 take place on the United States flag vessel, the location of

the ultimate intended distribution should be immaterial. 95

Em-

ployed in this manner, section 955a(a) may be viewed as a proper
measure taken by the United States under the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, 9 6 which obligates its signatories to take steps to

control illegal narcotics trafficking,9

7

and the Convention on the

High Seas, which makes it the responsibility of each State to police the
vessels sailing under its flag.'
192. In order to have jurisdiction over an offense under international law, a State
need only meet one of the five jurisdictional requirements. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
193. Jurisdiction under this principle is provided for by a statute, 18 U.S.C. § 7
(1976), that makes a vessel registered in the United States part of the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id.; see United States v. Hayes, 653
F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980).
But see United States v. Perez-Herrera, 610 F.2d 289, 290 n.2 (5th Cir. 1980) (§ 7
only defines special maritime and territorial jurisdiction for purposes of Title 18

offenses).
194. United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); House
Report, supra note 1, at 10; see Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 422-24 (1970).
195. Cf. United States v. Gomez-Tostado, 597 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1979)
(location of intended distribution immaterial "so long as the intent coincides at some
point with possession in the United States"); United States v. Feld, 514 F. Supp. 283,
286, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); United States v. Madalone, 492 F. Supp. 916, 920
(S.D. Fla. 1980) (same). Where a basis of jurisdiction, such as the law of the flag
theory, is present, the issue becomes whether § 955a(a), as applied to a United States
vessel, requires intent to distribute within the United States. There is no question of
international jurisdiction, only one of congressional intent. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text. In light of Congress's expressed intent that the statute have
extraterritorial application, there is no reason-as long as law of the flag jurisdiction
is present-to impose the same limitation upon § 955a(a) as has been imposed on §
841(a)(1). See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
196. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961,
18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force June 24,
1967).
197. Id. art. 4.
198. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 7, art. 5. This responsibility was
recognized by the court in United States v. One (1) 43 Foot Sailing Vessel Winds
Will, 405 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd per curiain, 538 F.2d 694 (5th
Cir. 1976). Winds Will was a forfeiture proceeding against a vessel seized while
engaged in narcotics smuggling. Id. at 881. The court stated that because article 6 of
the Convention gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction over its flag vessels on
the high seas, "the maintenance of public order on the world's oceans depends upon
effective control in accordance with their treaty obligations by the nations of the
world over vessels flying their flag." Id. at 882 (citing Convention on the High Seas,
supra note 7, art. 6); accord United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064 n.4
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
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The jurisdictional defect of section 955a(a) is in its application to

foreign nationals arrested aboard stateless vessels on the high seas. The
opinion in United States v. Angola' 99 illustrates this problem. The
alien defendants were arrested aboard the stateless vessel Mayo ap-

proximately 350 miles from the territorial United States.200 The court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, finding the protective theory applicable.20' In its opinion, the court acknowledged that "the crew of the Mayo may not have
202

had the specific intent to import marijuana into the United States,"
but recognized "the very great potential that other boats picking up
marijuana from the Mayo would have taken that marijuana into this

country or to some lower level of distributors who would have or

might have imported that marijuana into the United States." 2 0 3
The Angola court's application of section 955a(a) represents a literal
reading of the statute. The decision demonstrates that section 955a(a),

on its face, exceeds the limits of the protective principle, with its
requirements of a potentially adverse effect caused by conduct directed at the security of the State.20 4 Section 955a(a) requires no

showing that the conduct is directed at the United States.205 The
Angola court was careful to note that it was not dealing with a

situation where a stateless vessel was stopped "half way around the
199. 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
200. Id. at 936. The vessel was seized just west of the Bahamian island of San
Salvador. Id.
201. Id. at 935-36. The court adopted the holding of a prior case within the
district, United States v. Pauth-Arzuza, No. 80-577-Cr-CA, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 20, 1981). In both cases, the courts incorrectly framed the issue before them as
one of authority over a stateless vessel, rather than jurisdiction over the foreign crew
members. Although the ship may be stateless, its crew members have nationalities.
H. Meyers, The Nationality of Ships 309 (1967). Therefore, the statelessness of the
ship does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over the foreign crew
members. United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see
United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
202. 514 F. Supp. at 936.
203. Id.
204. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 884 (1967); Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 402(3) & comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). Compare id. § 402(3)
(jurisdiction over "conduct outside its territory ...

directed against the security of

the state or certain state interests") with Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 33 (1965) (jurisdiction over "conduct outside its
territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its governmental
functions"). The Tentative Draft is broader than the Second Restatement in Its
language concerning "certain state interests," but it makes explicit the requirement
that the conduct be directed at the State. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 33 (1965).
205. United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
House Report, supra note 1, at 12.
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world in the Gulf of Siam," 20 6 thus intimating it may not have had
subject matter jurisdiction had the ship been seized so far from the
United States. A literal application of section 955a(a), however, allows for no such distinctions; the statute requires no showing of a
threat0 7to the United States in order for the court to obtain jurisdiction.

2

The jurisdictional flaw of section 955a(a) was recognized in United
States v. James-Robinson.20 8 The district court dismissed the alien
defendants' indictment under section 955a(a) for failure to allege a
nexus to the United States sufficient to give the court subject matter
jurisdiction.209 The court imposed upon the statute's application a
limitation it said was required in order to conform to principles of
international law.210 When the seizure is of a stateless vessel on the
high seas, manned by foreign nationals, international principles of
jurisdiction require the government to allege and prove at trial that
the distribution proscribed in section 955a(a) was intended for the
territorial United States.2 1' In the court's opinion, the presence of a
stateless vessel with a cargo of narcotics 400 miles from the United
States did not by itself represent a threat to the United States sufficient
to invoke the protective principle, 12 though section 955a(a) on its face
assumes the contrary.
The James-Robinson court noted that all cases in which the protective principle was invoked involved
actions where there was a demonstrable effect on the United States
in particular.Never in a published opinion of an American court
[had] a potential generalized effect, which might or might not also
be an effect upon the United States, been found
sufficient to invoke
21 3
the protective principle of international law.

206. 514 F. Supp. at 936.
207. See United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1342 (S.D. Fla.
1981); House Report, supra note 1, at 12.
208. 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1346-47 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
209. Id. at 1342. The government contended that § 955a(a) "does not require the
intent to distribute in the United States, an arrest in or near the waters legally
controlled by this country, or any other special circumstances from which an intent
to distribute [in the United States] might be inferred or a nexus with the U.S. [be]
shown." Id.
210. See id. at 1346-47. The court analogized to a limitation it said had been
placed upon 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976) by recent cases, which required that an
intent to distribute within the United States be shown in order for that statute to
apply extraterritorially. Id. at 1346 (citing United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124,
1129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States v. Mann, 615 F.2d
668, 671 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981); United
States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1980)).
211. 515 F. Supp. at 1347.
212. Id. at 1346.
213. Id. at 1345 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). But see United States v.
Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933, 936 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (protective jurisdiction proper where
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The court held that for it to have jurisdiction over an offense under
section 955a(a), some nexus with an interest of the United States
would be essential.214 This effect could come from "involvement of
U.S. citizens, territory or vessels, from a destination (intended or
realized) in the United States, or from some threat to the national
security or governmental functions of the United States. ' 2

15

Such a

nexus could be inferred from evidence such as the location of a ship on
the high seas,216 the size of the shipment2 1 7 or other relevant evidence,218 but the absence of any allegation or offer of proof of intended territorial effects precluded reaching those issues.210
A statute that incorporates the limitation required by international
law and by the James-Robinson court would contain as an essential
220
element of the offense the proof of intended territorial effects.
Congress recognized this requirement when it enacted subsection
(d)221 of section 955a, which proscribes possession, manufacture or
marijuana "would or might have" been imported into the United States by persons
receiving marijuana from defendants); United States v. Pauth-Arzuza, No. 80-577Cr-CA, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 1981) (protective jurisdiction available
"notwithstanding the absence of any objective proof of an intent to import into the
United States"). The James-Robinson court noted the Angola and Pauth-Arzuza
holdings without comment. 515 F. Supp. at 1346 n.9.
214. Id. at 1347. The court added that to act without jurisdiction would be a
denial of due process under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 1347 n.10.
215. Id. at 1347. The court was acknowledging, sub silentio, that in order for it to
have subject matter jurisdiction over violations of § 955a(a), an internationally
accepted basis of jurisdiction, such as nationality, territoriality (or its corollary, law
of the flag), objective territoriality or the protective principle, has to be applicable.
See supra pt. I.
216. Id. (citing United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1063 (1980)).
217. 515 F. Supp. at 1347 (citing United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
218. 515 F. Supp. at 1347.
219. Id. at 1342, 1347.
220. See id. at 1346. The court said the absence of an allegation of an effect upon
national security or government functions, or of any effect whatsoever, might alone
render the indictment defective for failure to allege an essential fact. Id. (citing Fed.
R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)).
221. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(d) (West Supp. 1981). Subsection (d) is nearly identical
to 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1976) and provides in full: "It is unlawful for any person to
possess, manufacture, or distribute a controlled substance-(1) intending that it be
unlawfully imported into the United States; or (2) knowing that it will be unlawfully
imported into the United States." Id. § 955a(d). This subsection differs from § 959 in
two respects. First, § 955a(d) applies to all substances controlled by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (codified in scattered sections throughout U.S.C.), not just those in schedules I
and II. House Report, supra note 1, at 13. Second, § 955a(d) includes in its proscriptions possession with intent to unlawfully import or knowledge of impending unlawful importation. Id.
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distribution of a controlled substance with the intent or knowledge
that it will be unlawfully imported into the United States.'
The
subsection's comprehensive prohibitions are broad enough to apply to
foreign nationals aboard stateless vessels, while retaining the requirement that the government allege and prove intended territorial effects.22 3 This ensures that, at a minimum, protective jurisdiction will

be present. In order to apply properly to stateless vessels on the high
seas, subsection (a) must be redrafted to include a requirement similar
to that of subsection (d). Only by requiring that the narcotics possessed are intended for distribution within the United States will
subsection (a) of section 955a conform to principles of international
law.
CONCLUSION

A court claiming protective jurisdiction for the United States in a
high seas prosecution of foreign nationals seized on a stateless vessel,
without any showing of intended territorial effects or other threat to
the sovereignty or national interest of the United States, would be
unilaterally extending the protective principle further than is justified
by international law. It is conceded that criminals have no regard for
territorial boundaries or principles of jurisdiction and that the law
must remain flexible to respond to the sophisticated techniques of
today's narcotics smugglers. Absent elevation by international convention of narcotics trafficking to the status of a universally outlawed
offense, however, jurisdiction such as that asserted in section 955a(a)
has no basis in international law.
Customs that have developed in international law are designed to
allow each state to take measures necessary to regulate conduct within
its territory, the conduct of its citizens, conduct outside its territory
that adversely affects or threatens to adversely affect the State, and
conduct which violates the Law of Nations. The established principles
of international jurisdiction accomplish these goals in a manner consistent with the maintenance of a fragile international order. Unilateral expansion of these established principles by any State is not
conducive to maintenance of that order.
M. Lawrence Noyer

222. See supra note 176.
223. 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a(d) (West Supp. 1981).

